Yogācāraयोगाचार

The Four Parts of Cognition

catur-bhāga: nimitta-bhāga, darśana-bhāga, svasaṃvitti-bhāga, svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti-bhāga · 四分 sì fēn / shibun, "the four parts": 相分 xiàng fēn "mark-part", 見分 jiàn fēn "seeing-part", 自證分 zìzhèng fēn "self-witnessing part", 證自證分 zhèng zìzhèng fēn "witnessing of the self-witnessing"

According to Dharmapāla and the Chéng Wéishí Lùn, every act of cognition has four parts: the mark of the object, the seeing part, self-awareness, and the verification of self-awareness. The scheme shows that subject and object arise together from a single process.

The scheme of the four parts (四分 sì fēn, Jpn. shibun; reconstructed Sanskrit catur-bhāga) describes the structure of any act of cognition. Every consciousness and every mental factor, at the instant it arises, appears divided into four aspects: what is apprehended, the apprehending, the knowing that the apprehending takes place, and the verification of that knowing. The scheme is associated with Dharmapāla and the tradition of the Chéng Wéishí Lùn, and answers a decisive question: if everything is representation-only (Vijñaptimātra: representation-only), how are subject and object articulated?

The two basic parts

The Triṃśikā describes the consciousnesses as transformations (pariṇāma). The Chéng Wéishí Lùn explains that consciousness, in transforming, appears as two parts (bhāga, 分 fēn), and Dan Lusthaus translates the pair with Husserlian terms:

Part Term Function Lusthaus
Mark-part nimitta-bhāga, 相分 xiàng fēn The objective aspect: what appears as object Noema
Seeing part darśana-bhāga, 見分 jiàn fēn The subjective aspect: the act of apprehending Noesis

Nimitta is the sign or image under which something presents itself to cognition. The mark-part is not a copied external object; it is the object as it is constituted in cognition. This is why the scheme is central to the question of the object of cognition: the object is "representation-only" because it appears solely as one of the two faces of a cognitive act.

The two reflexive parts

The novelty attributed to Dharmapāla is the addition of two reflexive parts:

Part Term Function
Self-awareness svasaṃvitti-bhāga, 自證分 zìzhèng fēn Witnesses the seeing part: the knowing one has, without a separate act, that one is seeing
Witnessing of the self-witnessing svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti-bhāga, 證自證分 zhèng zìzhèng fēn Verifies self-awareness

Reflexive self-awareness has a page of its own, because its status was the center of a long debate. Lusthaus observes, in a note, that Dharmapāla is said to have "accepted a total of four bhāgas, not just these two". In the same book, he describes the third and the fourth as the reflexive portion, which can take a step back and observe the darśana-bhāga, and the one that can take a step back from self-reflection itself. According to Lusthaus, they are "precisely the 'self-evidencing' and the 'evidencing of the self-evidencing'", an approximation that he relates to Husserlian Evidenz.

Why four and not three

The reasoning is one of internal coherence. If the cognition of an object were all there is, no one could remember having perceived: a memory is the memory of an experience, and for there to be memory the experience must have been registered as experience. This requires a part that witnesses it (the third). But how can one know that this witness has not failed? The fourth part verifies it, and the third, in turn, verifies the fourth, so that the chain closes in a circle and does not extend to infinity. It is this reciprocal closure that prevents the infinite regress, and for that reason it is an essential part of the scheme.

The Chinese commentarial tradition (associated with Kuījī) relates the number of parts to the masters: one for Sthiramati, two for Nanda, three for Dignāga, and four for Dharmapāla. This is an account of the tradition, which this page reproduces with due caution: the dating and the detail of the attribution are debated.

Four parts, a single process

The four parts are not four things. They belong to the same consciousness, and the distinction is analytic. The Chéng Wéishí Lùn, according to Lusthaus, says that there are really only two parts, object and subject, and that the others are figurative, but that outside the pair of apprehender and apprehended there are no distinct things. This point is decisive for the reading the site defends in Idealism or phenomenology?: Yogācāra does not assert a mind that generates a world, but that subject and object appear together as faces of one and the same cognitive event.

There is a less obvious consequence. Lusthaus notes that the seeing part, which would seem active and subjective, is classified as "what is altered", that is, as a product of processes that are the three consciousnesses (ālaya, Kliṣṭa-manas: the Seventh Consciousness, Mano-vijñāna: the Sixth Consciousness) and that cannot be reduced to subject or object. The perceiver is, to a certain extent, a result of the process, and not its starting point. This connects the scheme to the fabrication of the self.

In summary

  • Every cognition has parts: the mark-part (object), the seeing part (apprehension), self-awareness, and its witnessing.
  • The first two form the noema/noesis pair; the last two explain the reflexivity of consciousness.
  • The scheme of four is attributed to Dharmapāla and the Chéng Wéishí Lùn; the tradition relates one, two, and three parts to other masters.
  • Subject and object appear together: the scheme is a response to the idealist temptation.
  • See Svasaṃvitti: reflexive self-awareness for the debate on self-awareness.