Yogācāraयोगाचार

सेतु

Bridges

Overview of the bridges between Yogācāra and other philosophical, contemplative and scientific traditions, with the criteria the site adopts to compare them without merging them.

This section gathers the comparisons between Yogācāra and other systems of thought: Western phenomenology, Indian Madhyamaka, the Buddhist schools of East Asia and Tibet, and contemporary cognitive sciences. A bridge, here, is a comparison that illuminates both sides and declares where each side diverges. It is not an equivalence.

Why build bridges

Yogācāra was born from a question about experience: how the The Mind: The Eight Consciousnesses constructs the world it lives in, and how this construction can be reversed. Questions of this kind reappear in other places and times. The reading the site adopts, that of Yogācāra as an analysis of experience and not as metaphysics (see Idealism or phenomenology?), is precisely the one that makes comparison possible: one can compare with Husserl or with neuroscience only a school that describes the constitution of experience, and not one that would assert that only mind exists.

The three kinds of bridge

Rules of reading

Three cautions apply to all the bridges in this section. First, structural convergence is not historical influence: Husserl hardly knew Yogācāra, and Vasubandhu did not know the brain. Second, science and Western philosophy do not confirm Buddhism, nor the reverse: the criteria of validity are different. Third, the difference of purpose is decisive. Yogācāra describes experience in order to transform it (see Āśraya-parāvṛtti: the revolution of the basis), and many of its interlocutors describe in order to know.

Where to begin

Those coming from philosophy can begin with Yogācāra and Western Phenomenology. Those coming from Buddhism can begin with Yogācāra and Madhyamaka and Dialogue Between Schools. Those coming from psychology and technology find the shortest path in Yogācāra and the Cognitive Sciences and Yogācāra and the Extended Mind. In all cases it is advisable to have read What Is Yogācāra and Vijñaptimātra: representation-only first.

Subtopics

1

Yogācāra and Western Phenomenology

An overview of the dialogue between Yogācāra and Western phenomenology, from Brentano and Husserl to Henry, Varela and Zahavi, by way of Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas and the Kyoto School: descriptive convergences, divergences, and the soteriological telos that Yogācāra adds.

2

Yogācāra and Western Philosophy

A bridge between Yogācāra and Western philosophy, from Plato and Plotinus to Descartes, Berkeley, Kant, German idealism, James, Whitehead, Sartre and analytic philosophy: precise doctrinal analogies, honest disanalogies, and what Western thought can learn from the tradition.

3

Yogācāra and Abhidharma

Yogācāra is an Abhidharma, not a break with it: it inherits the method of analysis into dharmas, momentariness and causality, offers one solution among several to the problem of latency, and reinterprets the dharma as a unit of representation.

4

Yogācāra and Madhyamaka

Yogācāra and Madhyamaka share the rejection of own-nature and of the subject-object duality, but differ in method and emphasis: a generic emptiness on one side, an analysis of the three natures and of the constitution of experience on the other.

5

Dialogue Between Schools

A comparative map of the dialogue between Yogācāra and the main Buddhist schools (Abhidharma, Madhyamaka, Tathāgatagarbha, Huayan, Tiantai and Nichiren, Chan/Zen, Pure Land, Vajrayāna and Hossō): where they converge, where they diverge, how each classifies the teachings and what each does with the ālaya.

6

Hossō: Japanese Yogācāra

Hossō (法相宗, 'school of the marks of the dharmas') is the Japanese branch of the Faxiang school of Xuánzàng and Kuījī: brought to Japan from 653, based at Kōfukuji and Yakushiji, protagonist of the debates with Saichō and Kūkai, renewed by Jōkei in Kamakura and still alive today. The page traces its history and the bridge that leads from it to Soga Ryōjin and to Yogācāra read from within Shin.

7

Yogācāra and Chan/Zen

Chan/Zen was born within the conceptual horizon of Yogācāra (the Laṅkāvatāra school) and turned it into direct practice; the page shows the doctrinal resonances and the points where Chan departs from the scholastic Yogācāra of Faxiang.

8

Yogācāra, Vajrayāna and Dzogchen

How Yogācāra entered Tibet through Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamaka synthesis, reappeared as kun gzhi, as the ritual map of the five wisdoms and as the pivot of the shentong/rangtong debate, and where Dzogchen and tantra go beyond it.

9

Yogācāra, Tiantai and Nichiren

Zhiyi's Tiantai ranks the teachings around the Lotus Sūtra; Nichiren radicalizes that ranking into exclusivism and demotes Yogācāra. The page sets out the doctrinal and historical critique of this system, compares 一念三千 with the ālaya, the ninth consciousness and the five natures, and shows what in it deserves recognition.

10

Yogācāra and the Pure Land

A reading of shinjin (Shinran's trusting mind) in light of Yogācāra, as an instance of the revolution of the basis and the loosening of manas, with Amida read as the phenomenological form of the dharmakāya; presented as a proposed interpretation, with its limits.

11

Yogācāra and the Cognitive Sciences

Bridges between Yogācāra and the cognitive sciences: predictive processing, enactivism, global workspace, integrated information theory, the hard problem, memory reconsolidation, attention and the neuroscience of meditation, with the limits of each analogy.

12

Yogācāra and Psychology

Abhidharma and Yogācāra are often called Buddhist psychology, and there are good reasons for that. This page compares the tradition with Freud, Jung, cognitive-behavioral therapy, schema therapy, mindfulness-based therapies, the science of emotions and, above all, Eugene Gendlin's Focusing, and explains why the site does not reduce Yogācāra to a psychology.

13

Yogācāra and the Extended Mind

Clark and Chalmers's extended mind thesis in dialogue with Yogācāra: the ālaya as a distributed processual dynamic rather than an inner receptacle, the objection of Adams and Aizawa, and intersubjectivity as an alternative to the so-called collective ālaya.