Yogācāraयोगाचार

Yogācāra and Psychology

心所 xīnsuǒ / shinjo, "mental factors"

Abhidharma and Yogācāra are often called Buddhist psychology, and there are good reasons for that. This page compares the tradition with Freud, Jung, cognitive-behavioral therapy, schema therapy, mindfulness-based therapies, the science of emotions and, above all, Eugene Gendlin's Focusing, and explains why the site does not reduce Yogācāra to a psychology.

"Buddhist psychology" is the name given to the tradition that, starting from Abhidharma and Yogācāra, analyzes the mind into consciousnesses (the mind), mental factors (The mental factors (caitasika)), seeds (Bīja: the seeds) and afflictions (The Root and Secondary Afflictions). The expression is useful as an entry point, but the site uses it with caution: Yogācāra describes the mind so that it can be transformed, and not merely to explain it.

Why "Buddhist psychology," and why not only that

Abhidharma (The Abhidharma Heritage) produced a meticulous inventory of mental events: which factors accompany every consciousness, which are wholesome (kuśala), which are afflictive. Yogācāra added the structure of eight consciousnesses, with the ālaya-vijñāna as the base and manas as self-deliberation. Anyone who reads this material with a background in psychology immediately recognizes a typology of mental processes, a theory of memory and a theory of inner conflict.

The site resists the reduction for three reasons:

  • Soteriological telos. The analysis serves liberation. The aim is not to adjust the subject to the world, but to revolve the basis (revolution of the basis) on which illusion rests.
  • Phenomenological reading. Yogācāra describes the appearing of experience, and not an entity called "psyche" behind it. This is the reading of Lusthaus (2002) and of the tradition of Soga Ryōjin (Dan Lusthaus, Soga Ryōjin), and not a metaphysical idealism that posits mind as ultimate substance (see Idealism or phenomenology? and Yogācāra and Western Phenomenology).
  • Not psychologizing. Translating each term by a clinical equivalent erases what the term does in contemplative practice and turns a path of awakening into a technique of well-being.

Depth psychology: Freud, Jung and the ālaya

The comparison with Freud and Jung is an old one, and one must be fair to both sides.

Freudian unconscious Jungian unconscious Ālaya-vijñāna
Content drives and repressed contents archetypes and complexes seeds of every kind, wholesome or not
Nature dynamics of conflict polarities to be integrated momentary flow, without substance
Goal making conscious what was repressed individuation revolution of the basis, awakening

Freud's unconscious

In Das Unbewusste (1915), Freud describes a psychic system governed by its own processes, fed by representations of drives that have been repressed because they are intolerable to the conscious ego. The unconscious is, above all, the place of conflict: what is in it is there by force of a defense.

The ālaya does not work this way. First, it is morally neutral (avyākṛta): it is neither good nor bad, and it stores wholesome and unwholesome seeds. Second, its object, according to the Triṃśikā, is apprehended imperceptibly: it sustains the body and the world without being noticed. This is not repression; it is the background condition of all experience. Third, it is not a content or a place; it is a flow that renews itself at every instant, in which seeds ripen and new ones are planted (Bīja: the seeds, Vāsanā: the impregnations). What comes closer to the Freudian conflict, in Yogācāra, is the pair formed by Kliṣṭa-manas: the Seventh Consciousness and the afflictions (The Root and Secondary Afflictions), which take the base to be a self and defend it. The most honest analogy is therefore between the dynamics of manas and those of the defensive ego, and not between the ālaya and the id.

Waldron (2003) argues, in The Buddhist Unconscious, that the ālaya should be thought of in dialogue with the sciences of the mind, without identifying it with the Western unconscious. The site follows this caution.

Jung and the idea of a collective unconscious

Jung (1959) distinguishes a personal unconscious and a collective unconscious, an inherited layer common to the species, whose contents are the archetypes. Some commentators have likened this common ground to a "collective ālaya," as if all beings drank from the same reservoir. The temptation is understandable: Jung opened space for Eastern traditions, and Yogācāra also speaks of a shared world.

The site rejects this reading, for two reasons.

  1. It would reify a single ground. The ālaya is always the ālaya of a stream (santāna). Each stream has its own, with its own history of seeds. A collective ālaya would make it an entity, which contradicts the analysis of dharmas as momentary events (Dharmas) and would come close to an absolute of a substantial type, something Yogācāra expressly avoids.
  2. It explains less than it seems to. What needs to be explained is why distinct beings experience compatible worlds. The Yogācāra answer, already in the discussion of the pretas (hungry ghosts) who see the same river as pus in the Viṃśatikā (Viṃśatikā), is that streams with similar actions ripen similar appearances, and that streams influence one another.

For this reason the site prefers to speak of Intersubjectivity and the common world. The common world is not in a shared storehouse: it is constituted between streams, through language, the body, social practice and the reciprocal influence of seeds. This reading is phenomenologically more sober, preserves the singularity of each stream and accounts for what is shared without postulating a single base.

Cognitive-behavioral therapy and vikalpa

Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT), founded in large part by Aaron Beck (Beck et al., 1979), starts from the cognitive model: it is not events that directly disturb us, but the interpretation a person makes of them. There are three layers: automatic thoughts (quick, situational), intermediate beliefs (rules and assumptions) and core beliefs (ideas about oneself, others and the world). The therapy identifies distortions (catastrophizing, mind reading, all-or-nothing thinking), examines evidence and proposes behavioral experiments.

The classic parallel is with vikalpa (分別 fēnbié / funbetsu, "discrimination, conceptual construction"). The tradition teaches that experience is permeated by constructions that carve it into grasper and grasped (grāhaka, grāhya), and that suffering arises from treating the construction as if it were the given (Parikalpita: the imagined nature, Abhūtaparikalpa: The Imagination of the Unreal). The similarity is real: both traditions say that the interpretation is not the thing, and that one can learn to see it as interpretation.

The differences weigh more than the similarity.

  • Level of analysis. CBT works mainly on the content of thoughts: true or false, useful or useless. Yogācāra investigates the structure that makes any content possible, the subject-object bipolarity, and not only the error of a particular judgment.
  • Criterion. In CBT, a thought is corrected when it proves maladjusted to reality or to well-being. In Yogācāra, even a true and useful belief remains, as a concept, a construction to be understood in its dependent nature (Paratantra: the dependent nature).
  • Goal. CBT reduces symptoms and restructures beliefs. Yogācāra aims at the cessation of dual grasping, which is the meaning of a transformation (Āśraya-parāvṛtti: the revolution of the basis).

A point of contact is the idea of decentering, now common in clinical practice: observing a thought as a mental event, and not as a fact. It resonates with the practice of recognizing representation as representation (vijñapti, Vijñaptimātra: representation-only). It only resonates, however: clinical decentering does not claim, in itself, to undo the subject-object structure.

Schema therapy

Schema therapy, by Jeffrey Young (Young, Klosko and Weishaar, 2003), extends CBT to enduring patterns of character. Its central concept is the early maladaptive schema: a broad pattern of memory, emotion, bodily sensation and cognition, formed in childhood when basic emotional needs (attachment, autonomy, limits, expression) were not met, and later reactivated by situations that evoke it. Modes are momentary states, such as the vulnerable child, the inner critic or the detached protector, between which the person alternates. The technique combines cognitive work, imagery, empathic confrontation and a "limited reparenting" within the therapeutic relationship.

The dialogue with Yogācāra is more promising than that with conventional CBT, because the schema is, like vāsanā (習氣 xíqì / jikke, "impregnation, habit-residue"), a sedimented disposition that is activated when conditions call it forth. There are two possible correspondences:

  • The schema recalls the seeds and impregnations in its character as a latent disposition that "ripens" in contexts.
  • The mode, as a transitory state, reminds us that the mind is a flow of events, and not a block.

The limits, however, are clear. The schema is biographical and has a date of origin in childhood. Buddhist impregnation is, in the tradition, prior to this life and of much wider scope, and is not reduced to a relational wound. Moreover, schema therapy strengthens a healthy self, whereas Yogācāra investigates the very mechanism by which the self is formed. The two tasks are compatible in sequence, as Engler (1984) recalls in saying that one needs a functional self before investigating it, but they are not identical.

Mindfulness-based therapies

In the 1970s Jon Kabat-Zinn created Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR), an eight-week program that teaches body scanning, sitting meditation and mindful movement to patients with chronic pain and illness. In Full Catastrophe Living (1990), he presents the practice as intentional attention to the present moment, without judgment. From this core derived:

  • MBCT (mindfulness-based cognitive therapy; Segal, Williams and Teasdale, 2002), which combines the practice with elements of CBT to prevent relapse in depression, teaching people to see negative thoughts as mental events, and not as truths.
  • ACT (acceptance and commitment therapy; Hayes, Strosahl and Wilson, 1999), which works on cognitive defusion (stepping back from the content of thought), acceptance, attention to the present and value-aligned action, with the aim of increasing psychological flexibility.

The Buddhist word of origin is smṛti (念 niàn / nen, "mindfulness, remembrance"). In Abhidharma and Yogācāra, smṛti is a mental factor that fixes attention on a known object, one of the five object-determining factors, and not a universal quality of consciousness. Its use is always set within a path that includes ethics, support from samādhi (concentration) and discernment (prajñā).

Yogācāra draws on the clinic and questions it at three points:

  • Decontextualization. Removed from ethics and view, mindfulness can serve any end. It recalls the distinction between attention that is wholesome and attention that is neutral.
  • Decentering and manas. Observing thoughts as mental events is a real step, but it still operates on the plane of the sixth consciousness (Mano-vijñāna: the Sixth Consciousness). The egoic root in Kliṣṭa-manas: the Seventh Consciousness shows itself only in prolonged practice and under suitable conditions.
  • Adverse effects. Recent research (Lindahl et al., 2017) documents that meditation can produce difficult experiences in some practitioners, which is why the tradition values the teacher and the context.

Eugene Gendlin's Focusing

Eugene Gendlin (1926-2017) was a philosopher and psychotherapist. He worked with Carl Rogers at the University of Chicago and asked why some people benefit from therapy and others do not. His answer, in Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning (1962), was that what is decisive is the way a person relates to their own not yet articulated bodily experience. From this research Focusing (1978) was born, and his philosophy matured in A Process Model (1997). Later he also developed thinking at the edge, a method for formulating what does not yet have words.

The felt sense and the six steps

The felt sense is the bodily, diffuse and as yet unnamed apprehension of an entire situation. It is neither an emotion nor a thought: it is the "something" that is there before becoming either. When the person finds the word, image or gesture that expresses it, a felt shift occurs, a small perceptible change, a relief or opening. The six steps of Focusing are:

  1. Clearing a space: making room, setting each concern aside, at a respectful distance.
  2. Felt sense: choosing an issue and letting the body form the global sense of it.
  3. Handle: finding the "handle," a word, phrase or image that matches the felt sense.
  4. Resonating: checking the expression against the felt sense, going back and forth until it resonates.
  5. Asking: asking the felt sense itself what it needs, what is the worst of it.
  6. Receiving: receiving what has come with welcome, without trying to solve it.

Correspondences with Yogācāra

The approach between Focusing and Yogācāra is a line of work of the site's editor, Rev. Mauricio Hondaku (Rev. Mauricio Hondaku). The proposed correspondences follow, all as resonance, and not as identity.

  • Felt sense and Parikalpita: the imagined nature. The felt sense is an apprehension prior to the crystallization of name-and-form. The imagined nature (parikalpita) arises when experience becomes fixed on designated object and subject; the felt sense is experience still fluid, before this fixation.
  • Felt shift and Āśraya-parāvṛtti: the revolution of the basis. The revolution of the basis is the radical transformation of the foundation of experience. The felt shift is a minimal reorganization, on a microscopic scale, that shows by analogy how a change of support can be felt, without being equivalent to the revolution.
  • Vāsanā: the impregnations and Bīja: the seeds: the body laden with history. The felt sense is the sedimented past, felt in the present body. This recalls the way the impregnations and seeds of the ālaya condition the now.
  • Kliṣṭa-manas: the Seventh Consciousness and the "self that defends itself." Vasubandhu says that manas takes the ālaya as its object and has deliberation as its nature (mananātmaka). Manas takes the base to be a "self," and this self-centering is the defense that Focusing encounters when a person identifies with a feeling: the step of placing the feeling "to the side" undoes this identification a little.
  • Mental factors. Among the omnipresent factors, vedanā (feeling) is the immediate affective tone; saṃjñā (apprehension of the sign) is the carving that gives form; cetanā (intention) orients; manaskāra (attention) directs consciousness. Focusing trains precisely attention and feeling, slowing the saṃjñā that closes off meaning too early. See The mental factors (caitasika).
  • Clearing a space and non-appropriation. Placing each thing at a distance is an exercise in non-appropriation: what arises is not "mine," it is something before which one stands. The ālaya as ādāna-vijñāna is the consciousness that appropriates, and the gesture of setting aside softens appropriation.

Limits of the analogy

Focusing is therapeutic: it seeks to relieve, integrate and give meaning. Yogācāra aims at awakening, the extinction of the obstacles of the afflictions (The Root and Secondary Afflictions) and of the knowable. A felt shift can be authentic and useful without touching Kliṣṭa-manas: the Seventh Consciousness at its root. The relation is one of resonance and of service to practice, never of substituting one path for the other.

The 51 mental factors and the science of emotions

Yogācāra, following the tradition of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Abhidharmasamuccaya) and of Vasubandhu, enumerates 51 mental factors (五十一心所 wǔshíyī xīnsuǒ / gojūichi shinjo, "fifty-one mental factors"), distributed in six groups (The mental factors (caitasika)):

Group No. Examples
Omnipresent (The Five Omnipresent Factors) 5 vedanā (feeling), saṃjñā (apprehension of the sign), cetanā (intention), sparśa (contact), manaskāra (attention)
Object-determining 5 chanda (aspiration), adhimokṣa (conviction), smṛti (mindfulness), samādhi (concentration), prajñā (discernment)
Wholesome (The Eleven Wholesome Factors) 11 śraddhā (trust), hrī (self-respect), apatrāpya (conscientiousness), non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion, effort, tranquility, vigilance, equanimity, non-violence
Root afflictions (The Root and Secondary Afflictions) 6 craving, aversion, pride, ignorance, doubt, distorted view
Secondary afflictions 20 anger, resentment, envy, miserliness, torpor, agitation, forgetfulness, distraction
Indeterminate 4 regret, sleep, coarse investigation, subtle investigation

The science of emotions offers two major models for comparison. The basic emotions model (Ekman, 1992) holds that there is a small set of discrete and universal emotions. The constructivist model (Barrett, 2017) holds that emotions are constructed by the brain from bodily signals, context and learned concepts, against a background of core affect (valence and arousal).

Careful mappings

  • Vedanā and core affect. Pleasant, painful or neutral feeling is very close to the valence of core affect. This is the best point of contact, and even it is not an identity: vedanā is a factor of consciousness, and not a physiological measure.
  • Saṃjñā and categorization. Apprehending the sign, carving and naming, has an affinity with the conceptual categorization that, in the constructivist model, turns sensations into specific emotions. The conversation with Barrett is especially interesting here, because both hold that the name takes part in constituting the lived experience.
  • Manaskāra and attention. It corresponds roughly to the orientation of attention, but in the tradition it is also an ethical and intentional orientation.
  • Afflictions and emotions. Aversion (pratigha) comes close to anger, but the Buddhist list does not catalog emotions by facial expression or physiology: it catalogs states by the function they serve in the cycle of grasping and suffering. For this reason pride (māna) and distorted view (dṛṣṭi) are not emotions in Ekman's sense, and trust (śraddhā) is not a basic emotion.
  • Wholesome factors. Many have no equivalent in the modern emotional vocabulary. Hrī and apatrāpya refer to a sense of moral shame before oneself and before others, of ethical value, and not to shame as an aversive affect to be treated.

There are two general cautions. First, the list is an instrument of practice: it serves to recognize, in the moment, which factor is operating, and not to classify persons. Second, no factor is an empirical object verified in a laboratory; the neuroscientific translation is always a hypothesis. The bridge with the cognitive sciences is discussed in Yogācāra and the Cognitive Sciences.

Trauma and vāsanā: a cautious approach

It is tempting to identify trauma with vāsanā: the deep mark left by an experience, which reappears under trigger conditions and escapes voluntary control. Trauma, in contemporary clinical practice, is often described as implicit, bodily memory, which the subject relives instead of recalling. The similarity with the impregnations of the ālaya, which condition perception and action without passing through reflection, is real.

The site recommends caution, for three reasons.

  1. Different categories. Vāsanā is a general concept about all experience, including routine, language and learning. Trauma is a clinical category, with its own criteria, treatment and risks. To say that "trauma is vāsanā" impoverishes both.
  2. Risk of inappropriate use. Contemplative practice can reactivate traumatic memories, and adverse effects are on record (Lindahl et al., 2017). It is not for an encyclopedia to prescribe practices as trauma therapy. Anyone who suffers from trauma should seek a qualified mental health professional, and contemplative practice should be accompanied.
  3. A different ethical sense. The tradition sees vāsanā as part of a cycle of action and fruit without blaming. To apply the logic of karma to a victim's suffering would be mistaken and offensive, and nothing in the doctrine requires it.

Clinical healing and revolution of the basis are transformations of a different kind, and one does not replace the other. Within these limits, the doctrine of seeds offers a useful image, presented as resonance and never as method: the past is not a fixed block, but a disposition that transforms with new conditions.

Humanistic and contemplative psychology

The most fruitful approach did not come from psychoanalysis, but from traditions that give value to lived experience.

  • Carl Rogers (On Becoming a Person, 1961) proposed unconditional acceptance and empathic listening. It resonates with the attitude of not judging what arises, central to contemplative practice.
  • Mindfulness extracted a clinical method from mindfulness (smṛti). From the standpoint of Yogācāra, it is a part of the path, and not the whole path.
  • Mark Epstein (Thoughts Without a Thinker, 1995) reads the dissolution of the Buddhist self with psychoanalytic instruments.
  • Jack Engler (1984) discussed the relation between the therapeutic goal and the contemplative goal, and the need for a functional self before investigating it.

See also Yogācāra and the Cognitive Sciences and Yogācāra and the Extended Mind for the dialogues with the science of mind.

In summary

  • "Buddhist psychology" is a legitimate label, but Yogācāra has a soteriological telos and a phenomenological reading, neither psychological nor idealist.
  • The ālaya-vijñāna resembles the unconscious in being pre-reflective and laden with the past, but it is neither repression nor archetype, and never a "collective unconscious": what is shared is explained by intersubjectivity.
  • CBT and vikalpa agree that the interpretation is not the thing, but differ in level of analysis and in goal; schema therapy dialogues better with the impregnations, without exhausting them.
  • Clinical mindfulness (MBSR, MBCT, ACT) inherits smṛti, but Yogācāra places it back within an ethical path of discernment.
  • The 51 mental factors are an instrument of practice, and their mappings onto the science of emotions (valence, categorization, attention) are partial hypotheses; trauma calls for caution and professional accompaniment.
  • Gendlin's Focusing (felt sense, felt shift) resonates with pre-conceptual apprehension, the revolution of the basis and non-appropriation, without identity between them.