The Viṃśatikā ("Twenty [verses]"; full title Viṃśatikā vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ, "Demonstration of representation-only in twenty [verses]") is a work by Vasubandhu (4th-5th c., dating debated) written in verse, with a prose self-commentary (vṛtti). If the Triṃśikā is the map of the mind, the Viṃśatikā is its defense: a treatise of debate in which the thesis of representation-only is put to the test before a realist opponent.
The text
The Sanskrit was found by Sylvain Lévi (Sylvain Lévi) in Nepal and published in 1925; Jonathan Silk published in 2016 a critical edition with additional manuscripts. The text has 22 verses: the title "Twenty" counts the twenty of the argument and leaves out the first (the thesis) and the last (the conclusion), an explanation that is conventional and not unique. China received it three times: Gautama Prajñāruci (Taishō 1588, first half of the 6th c.), Paramārtha (Taishō 1589, 563) and Xuanzang (唯識二十論 Wéishí èrshí lùn, Taishō 1590, 661). Xuanzang's disciple Kuījī (窺基 Kuījī, Jap. Kiki) wrote the commentary that the Hossō school studies to this day (Taishō 1834).
The structure of the debate
The opponent is not a straw man: it is Abhidharma atomism (Vasubandhu himself is the author of the Abhidharmakośa; see The Abhidharma Heritage) and the Indian realist ontologies. The moves, in summary (the detailed analysis is in The Arguments of the Viṃśatikā):
- Verse 1: the thesis. The threefold world is representation-only, because it appears as a non-existent object, like the strands of hair seen by someone with blurred vision.
- Verses 2 to 7: the four objections. If there is no external object, why is experience fixed in place and time, common to several subjects, and efficacious? Vasubandhu answers with the dream, the hungry ghosts (who see pus where others see water) and hell, and asks why karma should produce matter, if it can directly produce experience.
- Verses 8 to 10: scripture. The doctrine of the twelve bases was spoken with a specific intention, to lead to the selflessness of the person; representation-only takes the next step, the selflessness of dharmas "with respect to the imagined nature" (see The Three Absences of Nature).
- Verses 11 to 15: the atom. The external object is neither one, nor many atoms, nor an aggregate, since the atom, when examined, dissolves. The theme is taken up and shifted by Dignāga in the Ālambanaparīkṣā.
- Verses 16 and 17: perception and dream. The judgment "I am seeing this" comes after the seeing; only one who awakens knows that they were dreaming.
- Verses 18 to 21: other minds. The series of experience condition one another; one mind can alter another, and mental fault is the gravest.
- Verse 22: the limit. The argument reaches as far as reason can; the rest is the domain of the Buddha.
What "only" negates
The idealist reading (that only the mind exists and the world is illusion) has support in the vocabulary of the text and in serious scholars, such as Schmithausen (Lambert Schmithausen). But Vasubandhu himself provides the key: at the opening of the vṛtti, he says that mātra ("only") "serves to negate the object" (arthapratiṣedhārtham), and that citta, manas, vijñāna and vijñapti are synonyms. What is negated is the artha, the object as an external thing independent of experience, not experience. This is the point that the site takes as decisive (see Idealism or phenomenology? and Why Yogācāra Is Not Idealism).
There are three further supports in the text for the phenomenological reading defended by Kochumuttom (Thomas Kochumuttom) and Lusthaus (Dan Lusthaus):
- Verse 10 says that dharmas lack self only "with respect to the imagined nature", and that representation-only itself cannot become a new absolute.
- In verse 18 there are many mental series that influence one another: neither solipsism nor a cosmic mind. This is what the site calls Intersubjectivity and the common world: the common world is the network of conditioning among series, and not an object out there.
- In verse 21, knowledge of one's own mind is as little "conforming" as that of another's mind: there is no transparent subject at the center, contrary to what modern idealism usually supposes.
Three Chinas in the first verse
The three Chinese versions show three ways of receiving the text. Paramārtha calls consciousness-only 自性靜 (zìxìng jìng, "of serene nature") and renders the object as 塵 (chén, "dust"), a vocabulary that Chan will inherit. Prajñāruci begins with 唯識無境界 (wéishí wú jìngjiè, "consciousness-only, without a domain of objects") and, in the commentary, identifies the mind with a "mind pure by nature". Xuanzang does not translate verse 1 as a verse: he gives its content in technical prose, without pure mind or dust, with the pair "internal consciousness" and "external object" that the Hossō school will refine (see Chéng Wéishí Lùn). The manuscripts also diverge between "hairs and moons" and "floaters"; the Chinese versions seem to reflect different manuscript traditions.
Echoes and continuity
The dream as an image of awakening circulated in China and Japan (Zhuangzi, Dōgen) and in Tibet as a practice (dream yoga). Verse 18 anticipates, centuries ahead, the problem of intersubjectivity that Husserl faced in the fifth of the Cartesian Meditations (see Yogācāra and Western Phenomenology). The argument of the atom dialogues with the Madhyamaka critique of "own-being" (see Yogācāra and Madhyamaka).
In summary
- A treatise of debate by Vasubandhu, with verses and self-commentary, in defense of representation-only.
- It answers the objections of realism with the dream, the hungry ghosts, the refutation of the atom and the plurality of mental series.
- "Only" negates the independent external object, not experience; the text ends by recognizing the limit of reason.
- It was rendered three times into Chinese; each version carries a different reading of the first verse.
Full text
Each verse in three lines: the site’s English translation (from the Sanskrit), the Sanskrit original (IAST) and the Chinese canonical translation (Taishō), with the Japanese reading.
I. The thesis and the four objections (verses 1 to 7)
This is representation-only, because it appears as a nonexistent object; just as one suffering from timira [blurred vision] sees hairs, moons, and other things that do not exist.
vijñaptimātram evaitad asadarthāvabhāsanāt | yathā taimirikasyāsatkeśacandrādidarśanam || 1 ||
實無有外塵,似塵識生故,猶如瞖眼人,見毛兩月等。 jitsu mu u ge jin, ji jin shiki shō ko, yu nyo ei gen nin, ken mō ryō gatsu tō. (Paramārtha, T1589, 31: 74a03-04; Xuanzang não tem verso, ver nota d)
[Objection:] If representation has no object, then neither the fixing of place and time, nor the non-fixing with regard to the series [of those who perceive], nor the performance of function can be sustained.
yadi vijñaptir anarthā niyamo deśakālayoḥ | saṃtānasyāniyamaś ca yuktā kṛtyakriyā na ca || 2 ||
若識無實境,則處時決定,相續不決定,作用不應成。 nyaku shiki mu jitsu kyō, soku sho ji ketsu jō, sō zoku fu ketsu jō, sa yū fu ō jō. (T1590, 31: 74c03-04)
The fixing of place and [of time] is established as in a dream. And, as with the hungry ghosts, the non-fixing with regard to the series: all [of them] see the river of pus and the rest.
deśādiniyamaḥ siddhaḥ svapnavat pretavat punaḥ | saṃtānāniyamaḥ sarvaiḥ pūyanadyādidarśane || 3 ||
處時定如夢,身不定如鬼,同見膿河等,如夢損有用。 sho ji jō nyo mu, shin fu jō nyo ki, dō ken nō ga tō, nyo mu son u yū. (T1590, 31: 74c15-16)
Efficacy [is established] as in a nocturnal emission in a dream. And, as in hell, everything [is established]: in the vision of the guardians of hell and the rest, and in being tormented by them.
svapnopaghātavat kṛtyakriyā narakavat punaḥ | sarvaṃ narakapālādidarśane taiś ca bādhane || 4 ||
一切如地獄,同見獄卒等,能為逼害事,故四義皆成。 is sai nyo ji goku, dō ken goku sotsu tō, nō i hitsu gai ji, ko shi gi kai jō. (T1590, 31: 75a01-02)
Animals may be born in heaven; in hell it is not so, nor for the hungry ghosts; because they do not experience the suffering that arises from there.
tiraścāṃ saṃbhavaḥ svarge yathā na narake tathā | na pretānāṃ yatas tajjaṃ duḥkhaṃ nānubhavanti te || 5 ||
如天上傍生,地獄中不爾,所執傍生鬼,不受彼苦故。 nyo ten jō bō shō, ji goku chū fu ni, sho shū bō shō ki, fu ju hi ku ko. (T1590, 31: 75a17-18)
If it is admitted that, through their actions, material elements arise there, and that they are transformed in that way, why is [the transformation] of consciousness not admitted?
yadi tatkarmabhis tatra bhūtānāṃ saṃbhavas tathā | iṣyate pariṇāmaś ca kiṃ vijñānasya neṣyate || 6 ||
若許由業力,有異大種生,起如是轉變,於識何不許? nyaku ko yu gō riki, u i dai shu shō, ki nyo ze ten hen, o shiki ga fu ko. (T1590, 31: 75a27-28)
The impregnation of the action is in one place, and the fruit is imagined in another. [The fruit] is not admitted precisely where the impregnation is: what is the reason?
karmaṇo vāsanānyatra phalam anyatra kalpyate | tatraiva neṣyate yatra vāsanā kiṃ nu kāraṇam || 7 ||
業熏習餘處,執餘處有果,所熏識有果,不許有何因? gō kun jū yo sho, shū yo sho u ka, sho kun shiki u ka, fu ko u ga in. (T1590, 31: 75b02-03)
II. The scripture and the two absences of self (verses 8 to 10)
The existence of the bases [of cognition], visible form and the others, was taught with a view to the persons to be guided by that [teaching], by force of an intention; like [the existence of] beings of spontaneous birth.
rūpādyāyatanāstitvaṃ tadvineyajanaṃ prati | abhiprāyavaśād uktam upapādukasattvavat || 8 ||
依彼所化生,世尊密意趣,說有色等處,如化生有情。 e hi sho ke shō, se son mitsu i shu, setsu u shiki tō sho, nyo ke shō u jō. (T1590, 31: 75b10-11)
The own seed from which representation arises, and the appearance with which it arises: the Sage spoke of these two as its two bases.
yataḥ svabījād vijñaptir yadābhāsā pravartate | dvividhāyatanatvena te tasyā munir abravīt || 9 ||
識從自種生,似境相而轉,為成內外處,佛說彼為十。 shiki ju ji shu shō, ji kyō sō ni ten, i jō nai ge sho, butsu setsu hi i jū. (T1590, 31: 75b17-18)
Thus [taught], there is entry into the absence of self of the person. In another way, the teaching is entry into the absence of self of dharmas, with regard to [their] imagined nature.
tathā pudgalanairātmyapraveśo hi anyathā punaḥ | deśanā dharmanairātmyapraveśaḥ kalpitātmanā || 10 ||
依此教能入,數取趣無我,所執法無我,復依餘教入。 e shi kyō nō nyū, shu shu shu mu ga, sho shū hō mu ga, bu e yo kyō nyū. (T1590, 31: 75b25-26)
III. The refutation of atoms (verses 11 to 15)
That object is neither a unity nor a multiplicity in the manner of atoms; nor are they [the object] when aggregated; because the atom is not established.
na tad ekaṃ na cānekaṃ viṣayaḥ paramāṇuśaḥ | na ca te saṃhatā yasmāt paramāṇur na sidhyati || 11 ||
以彼境非一,亦非多極微,又非和合等,極微不成故。 i hi kyō hi ichi, yaku hi ta goku mi, u hi wa gō tō, goku mi fu jō ko. (T1590, 31: 75c16-17)
By simultaneous conjunction with six [others], the atom would have six parts. If the six occupied the same place, the aggregate would have the size of one atom.
ṣaṭkena yugapadyogāt paramāṇoḥ ṣaḍaṃśatā | ṣaṇṇāṃ samānadeśatvāt piṇḍaḥ syād aṇumātrakaḥ || 12 ||
極微與六合,一應成六分;若與六同處,聚應如極微。 goku mi yo roku gō, ichi ō jō roku bun, nyaku yo roku dō sho, ju ō nyo goku mi. (T1590, 31: 75c27-28)
If there is no conjunction of atoms, when they aggregate, whose is that [conjunction]? And it is not because of lacking parts that their conjunction is not established.
paramāṇor asaṃyoge tatsaṃghāte 'sti kasya saḥ | na cānavayavatvena tatsaṃyogo na sidhyati || 13 ||
極微既無合,聚有合者誰?或相合不成,不由無方分。 goku mi ke mu gō, ju u gō sha sui, waku sō gō fu jō, fu yu mu hō bun. (T1590, 31: 76a06-07)
What has division into parts according to the directions cannot be a unity. [If it has none,] how would there be shadow and obstruction? [If it is said that] the aggregate is not other [than the atoms], then those do not belong to it.
digbhāgabhedo yasyāsti tasyaikatvaṃ na yujyate | chāyāvṛtī kathaṃ vā anyo na piṇḍaś cen na tasya te || 14 ||
極微有方分,理不應成一;無應影障無,聚不異無二。 goku mi u hō bun, ri fu ō jō ichi, mu ō yō shō mu, ju fu i mu ni. (T1590, 31: 76a15-16)
If [the object] were one, there would be no going step by step, nor, at the same time, the reached and the unreached; nor the presence of many separate things; nor the invisibility of what is subtle.
ekatve na krameṇetir yugapan na grahāgrahau | vicchinnānekavṛttiś ca sūkṣmānīkṣā ca no bhavet || 15 ||
一應無次行,俱時至未至,及多有間事,并難見細物。 ichi ō mu shi gyō, ku ji shi mi shi, gyū ta u ken ji, byō nan ken sai motsu. (T1590, 31: 76b02-03)
IV. Perception, memory, and dream (verses 16 and 17)
The cognition "this is perceived" is as in a dream and [in states] similar to it. And when it [occurs], that object is no longer seen: how can it be considered to have been directly perceived?
pratyakṣabuddhiḥ svapnādau yathā sā ca yadā tadā | na so 'rtho dṛśyate tasya pratyakṣatvaṃ kathaṃ matam || 16 ||
現覺如夢等,已起現覺時,見及境已無,寧許有現量? gen kaku nyo mu tō, i ki gen kaku ji, ken gyū kyō i mu, nyō ko u gen ryō. (T1590, 31: 76b18-19)
It has already been said how representation [arises] with the appearance of that; and from it [comes] memory. One who has not awakened does not understand the nonexistence of the object seen in the dream.
uktaṃ yathā tadābhāsā vijñaptiḥ smaraṇaṃ tataḥ | svapne dṛgviṣayābhāvaṃ nāprabuddho 'vagacchati || 17 ||
如說似境識,從此生憶念。未覺不能知,夢所見非有。 nyo setsu ji kyō shiki, ju shi shō oku nen. mi kaku fu nō chi, mu sho ken hi u. (T1590, 31: 76b29)
V. Others, karma, and ethics (verses 18 to 20)
Through the dominant influence of one upon another, representations determine one another mutually. In a dream, the mind is seized by torpor; therefore the fruit is not equal.
anyonyādhipatitvena vijñaptiniyamo mithaḥ | middhenopahataṃ cittaṃ svapne tenāsamaṃ phalam || 18 ||
展轉增上力,二識成決定。心由睡眠壞,夢覺果不同。 ten den zō jō riki, ni shiki jō ketsu jō. shin yu sui men e, mu kaku ka fu dō. (T1590, 31: 76c18)
Death [comes] from a special modification of another's representation; just as the loss of memory and other alterations in others [come] from the mental power of piśāca and other [beings].
maraṇaṃ paravijñaptiviśeṣād vikriyā yathā | smṛtilopādikānyeṣāṃ piśācādimanovaśāt || 19 ||
由他識轉變,有殺害事業,如鬼等意力,令他失念等。 yu ta shiki ten hen, u setsu gai ji gō, nyo ki tō i riki, ryō ta shitsu nen tō. (T1590, 31: 76c29-77a01)
Or how would the forest of Daṇḍaka have become empty through the anger of a sage? Or how, by that, would it be established that mental punishment is the great fault?
kathaṃ vā daṇḍakāraṇyaśūnyatvam ṛṣikopataḥ | manodaṇḍo mahāvadyaḥ kathaṃ vā tena sidhyati || 20 ||
彈咤迦等空,云何由仙忿?意罰為大罪,此復云何成? dan ta ka tō kū, un ga yu sen fun, i batsu i dai zai, shi bu un ga jō. (T1590, 31: 77a09-10)
VI. Knowing the minds of others and one's own (verses 21 and 22)
How is the knowledge of those who know the minds of others not in accordance with the object? As for the knowledge of one's own mind: through ignorance, [it does not know] in the way that is the domain of the Buddha.
paracittavidāṃ jñānam ayathārthaṃ kathaṃ yathā | svacittajñānam ajñānād yathā buddhasya gocaraḥ || 21 ||
他心智云何,知境不如實?如知自心智,不知如佛境。 ta shin chi un ga, chi kyō fu nyo jitsu, nyo chi ji shin chi, fu chi nyo butsu kyō. (T1590, 31: 77a22-23)
This demonstration of representation-only I have made according to my capacity. But it, in all its aspects, is not conceivable: it is the domain of the Buddha.
vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ svaśaktisadṛśī mayā | kṛteyaṃ sarvathā sā tu na cintyā buddhagocaraḥ || 22 ||
我已隨自能,略成唯識義,此中一切種,難思佛所行。 ga i zui ji nō, ryaku jō yui shiki gi, shi chū is sai shu, nan shi butsu sho gyō. (T1590, 31: 77b02-03)
Sources of the text: Sanskrit: Lévi 1925. Chinese: Xuanzang, T1590 (v. 1: Paramārtha, T1589).